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Education and Political Socialisation
of a National-Colonial Political Elite in
French West Africa, 1936–47
Tony Chafer
Much has been written about the first generation of political leaders of French West Africa,
their leadership skills, personal resources and networks. Their attachment to, and close
links with, France played a crucial role in determining the pattern of decolonisation in
the colony. Through a study of their political socialisation, this article seeks to throw
light on the experiences and influences that fashioned their thinking about politics and
created a common stock of ideas, norms and values. Focusing in particular on their edu-
cation at the William Ponty School and two key moments that shaped their political
thinking—the Popular Front period (1936–38) and the immediate post-war period
(1944–47)—it will be argued that an appreciation of their process of political socialisa-
tion enhances our understanding of their political choices. A final section reflects on the
legacy of this process in the postcolonial period.
Studies of decolonisation in French West Africa have traditionally drawn attention to a
number of factors to explain the reluctance of the colony’s political leaders to call for
independence. Donal Cruise O’Brien, in a 1965 article, analysed the limits of political
choice facing African leaders in the period of decolonisation. The colony’s poverty in
resources, the lack of educated personnel resulting in dependence on French aid and
administrative staff, and gerrymandering by the colonial administration all limited the
political choices open to African political leaders.1 Michael Crowder added that
French West African political leaders’ lack of enthusiasm for political independence
was hardly surprising, given what had happened in Madagascar, Indochina and
Algeria.2 But, as Crowder himself acknowledged, it takes more than the economic
and political policies of France to explain why this was the case.3 Material structures
and the political opportunities afforded by the institutional structure were clearly
important, but the clinching factor is usually seen as the close links between the
colony’s political leaders and France: ‘Educated at “assimilationist” schools, employed
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by and large in the French administration, finding their parliamentary feet in the
National Assembly of France, devotees of French culture, there was an emotional
bond between them and their former masters, which has little parallel in English-
speaking Africa.’4 The key role played by these leaders in determining the pattern of
decolonisation in French West Africa cannot be doubted. Thanks to their willingness
to work with the French government, the transition from colonial rule to political
independence was largely smooth and French influence over its former colonial terri-
tories was maintained, if not enhanced, as a result of decolonisation.
Yet the facts of having received a French education, speaking French, working for
the government and enjoying French culture were no guarantee in themselves of pol-
itical moderation or loyalty to France. In the inter-war period in France the activities
of African nationalist activists and intellectuals such as Lamine Senghor (no relation of
the other Senghor—Le´opold Se´dar—who was later to become the first president of
Senegal) and Tiemoko Garan Kouyate´ are testimony to this.5 Similarly, after the
Second World War, African students at universities in France were the first group to
campaign publicly for independence.6 There has been a tendency to assume that the
‘Frenchness’ of the political leaders of French West Africa—the fact that they spoke
French and were deeply imbued with French culture—rendered their pro-French pol-
itical stance in the run-up to independence in some way ‘inevitable’. But this is to
reason with the benefit of hindsight: alternative futures, involving a less exclusive
relationship with the former colonial power, were imaginable for the former territories
of French West Africa—as Se´kou Toure´ (Guinea) and Diawadou Barry (Niger)
demonstrated in the 1958 referendum campaign. The fact that independence might
be problematic and less immediately attractive did not rule it out as a political option.
So why did most of the first post-war generation of political leaders of French West
Africa remain isolated from the spirit of Bandung? Why did they not follow the
example of their fellow English-speaking African leaders? Building on the ideas of
O’Brien and Crowder, G. Wesley Johnson has suggested that their political choices
should be seen as an expression of their ‘emotional attachment to the nation
state...to the metropole—that is, the French, not African nation’.7 In contrast, James
Genova has suggested that ‘there is little indication of an “emotional attachment”
to the nation-state [by] the assimilated Africans, especially to the “French” nation’.8
If this is the case, to what were they attached? One response might be to suggest
that they were actually critical of the French State, but wedded to the republican
ideals of liberty, equality, fraternity and modernity that, in theory at least, provided
its ideological underpinning. They were also attached to French language and
culture. Yet this was accompanied by a rejection of assimilation and a simultaneous
devotion to, and promotion of, African culture: indeed, this represented the very
essence of Senghorian ne´gritude and Houphoue¨t-Boigny’s defence of ‘la personnalite´
africaine’.9 All of this suggests the need for a more carefully nuanced analysis of the
political and cultural attachments of this first post-war generation of political
leaders of French West Africa. It is with this in mind that the principal aim of this
article is to explore further the processes of political socialisation of key actors from
this cohort of political leaders in order better to understand the political choices
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they made. In a short final section, some conclusions will then be drawn concerning
the legacy of this process of political socialisation in the postcolonial period.
I
Much has been written about the first generation of political leaders of French West
Africa. We know a great deal about the kind of leaders they were, what their leadership
skills were and what kinds of personal resources and networks they were able to mobilise
to underpin their leadership.10 However, their thinking about politics has been little
studied.11 The importance of normative and ideational structures in shaping the beha-
viour of social and political actors will be the central focus of this article.12 What were
the formative experiences and influences that shaped their thinking about politics and
that led to the acquisition of shared ideas, norms and values? And how can an under-
standing of these processes of political socialisation to which they were subject add a
further dimension to our understanding of their political choices?
In his edited collection Making Imperial Mentalities, J. A. Mangan usefully defines
the process of political socialisation as follows:
Narrowly conceived [it is the] deliberate inculcation of political knowledge, values
and practices by agents and agencies formally charged with the responsibility.
Broadly conceived, it may be considered to encompass not only political but also
apparently non-political learning, formal and informal, calculated and uncalculated,
which effects the learning of politically relevant individual and group behaviour.13 Q1
The key agency formally charged with the inculcation of knowledge is the school
system. This has particular significance in the French case as, since the foundation
of the e´cole re´publicaine under the Third Republic, French schools, and primary
schools especially, had the vocation not only to transmit knowledge but also to
form the new citizens of the Republic. Their aim was explicitly political: to counter
the obscurantism of the church schools and the continuing influence of monarchist
ideas by establishing a new, republican school system to disseminate the progressive
and modernising values of French republicanism.14 These embraced defending the
principles of 1789 and inculcating notions of patriotism, civic responsibility and
respect for order. Outside the schools, political socialisation took place through a
variety of formal and informal channels. These included information from official
sources such as the colonial government or media and were also the product of an
informal, unplanned process of value and norm acquisition through one’s social
and professional life, through interaction with, for example, friends and colleagues,
especially if these were people to whom one looked as models for one’s own ideas
and behaviour. Significant events that reshaped the political landscape—such as
changes of government or political crises—could also influence the acquisition of
appropriate political values, norms and practices by political actors.
It is important at this point to bear in mind two potential methodological problems
posed by the focus on political socialisation. First, the link between political thinking
and behaviour cannot be taken for granted. Many factors, such as political
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opportunity structures, interpersonal rivalries, personal interests, strongly held ideo-
logical commitments or ethical beliefs, condition the making of specific political
choices in complex ways that cannot be predicted. Second, individuals who have
been exposed to similar processes of political socialisation will in practice make pol-
itical choices that situate them at different points on the left-right political spectrum.
The purpose of examining processes of political socialisation is not therefore to seek to
explain specific political decisions made at particular conjunctures in some kind of
deterministic fashion or to impose an artificial uniformity on a heterogeneous
group of individuals who did not at the time see themselves as a coherent group,15
but rather to attempt to appreciate the framework of shared ideas, norms, values
and implicit rules—what Lynn Hunt calls the ‘political culture’—that both informs
and shapes the choices made by political actors.16 It is the genesis of this shared frame-
work of ideas, which shaped the collective intentions and actions of an elite cohort of
French-educated Africans and was forged in a specific colonial context between the
1930s and 1950s in French West Africa, that this article seeks to elucidate.
The political socialisation of this African elite was heavily influenced by the norms
and values of French republicanism. While these norms and values do not represent an
entirely homogeneous body of ideas, Pierre Rosanvallon has in a recent study set out to
define the ways in which they do nonetheless represent a specifically French way of
‘doing politics’, which he characterises as the ‘French political model’.17 Rosanvallon’s
analysis, in which he explores the paradoxes of, and tensions within, this model, can
help us to understand the thinking about politics of the elite cohort of French-
educated African leaders being studied here.
At the level of discourse and institutional structures, Rosanvallon points to the
Jacobin, centralising tradition, the tendency to authoritarianism (‘la tentation illibe´rale’),
the supreme value of popular sovereignty and the importance attached to the
‘educational’ role of the state (‘l’Etat instituteur’) in leading the process of social and pol-
itical modernisation. He then contrasts this to France’s social and political history, which
has been marked by popular resistance to centralisation, by often violent political and
ideological conflict and by a tendency to social revolution. He identifies the source of
this tension between ‘two different Frances’ as residing in the divorce between represen-
tation and reality, in other words the dichotomy between narratives (contained both in
official accounts and in those of historians) of the development of the French republican
state, on the one hand, and the actual historical experience, the reality of the social
history, on the other.18 The former is, essentially, an ideal model of French republican-
ism that emphasises order and unity, while the emphasis of the latter is on struggle. In
the specific colonial context within which the political socialisation of this elite cohort of
French-educated Africans took place, we shall see that they were exposed to and on
occasion adopted elements of the political discourse of both these narratives.
II
If we now turn to the formal education of this first generation of political leaders of
French West Africa, the William Ponty School played a crucial role, as many of
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them graduated from this school during the inter-war period. A few figures give a
sense of the school’s overwhelming importance in shaping the political destiny of
French West Africa in the late colonial period: of the sixteen African deputies
elected to the French National Assembly in 1946, eleven were Ponty graduates.19 In
1947, twenty-one Ponty graduates were elected to the new territorial assembly in
Coˆte d’Ivoire, twelve in Haute-Volta, five in Niger and nine in Senegal. The equivalent
figures for the 1952 territorial assembly elections were fourteen in Coˆte d’Ivoire, seven
in Haute-Volta, two in Niger and sixteen in Senegal.20 An impressive number of
‘Pontins’, as they were called, also became ministers in the first post-independence
governments of French West Africa.21 Even more tellingly, the first presidents of
four of the colony’s former territories—Fe´lix Houphoue¨t-Boigny of Coˆte d’Ivoire,
Hubert Maga of Dahomey (present-day Benin), Modibo Keita of Mali and Hamani
Diori of Niger—and the first prime minister of independent Senegal, Mamadou
Dia, were all graduates of the school: Houphoue¨t-Boigny graduated from Ponty in
the mid-1920s, Dia in 1930 and Maga, Keita and Diori in the mid-1930s.22
The nature of the education dispensed by Ponty at this time, and the attitudes and
values it cultivated, is therefore a useful starting point for understanding the political
socialisation of the colony’s future political leaders. It will also shed light on the atti-
tudes and values they shared with their contemporaries who passed through the
school, many of whom went on to form part of French Africa’s wider political elite.
As Ruth Schachter-Morgenthau has remarked, ‘Most parliamentarians and a high pro-
portion of the leaders of the rival political parties after the war were graduates of
Ponty. The temporary political differences of the post-war period, dictated by their
party affiliation, often masked their fundamental agreement on major issues.’23 An
examination of their education at Ponty will enable us better to appreciate the
origins of this ‘fundamental agreement’. This section will thus focus, first, on the
William Ponty School and then on some key vectors of the wider process of political
socialisation to which these future political leaders would have been exposed in the
French West Africa of the 1930s.
Colonial education in French West Africa had two main functions: to provide a
basic education to the African masses and to create a small indigenous elite of colonial
auxiliaries loyal to France.24 The resources were not available to meet the first objec-
tive, so that only some 5 per cent of the population of French West Africa had received
any French education by the end of the Second World War.25 France was, however,
more successful in meeting the second aim, essentially through a small network of
upper primary and post-primary schools. The latter were concentrated in the Four
Communes of Senegal and the most prestigious of these was the William Ponty
School, which was located on Gore´e until 1938 when it moved to a new site en
brousse close to the village of Se´bikotane, some 40 kilometres from Dakar. By the
end of the Second World War Ponty had produced some 2000 graduates—an
average of just over fifty per year—during its forty years’ existence, for a total
African population in French West Africa of some 15.5 million. It has been described
as the Oxford of French West Africa,26 although this is somewhat misleading as it was
in no sense a university, or even a secondary school providing a general education
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comparable to that provided in a metropolitan lyce´e. Rather, it provided post-primary
vocational education in three sections, training teachers, medical assistants (‘docteurs
africains’) and interpreters and clerks for the colonial service. Moreover, while the
school was indeed highly selective, the education provided at Ponty was not even
recognised as equivalent to that provided by similar post-primary schools in the
metropole. Indeed the diploma it awarded was valid only in Africa, which meant
that it was useless as a stepping stone to further study in France. It was not until
after the war that Pontins were allowed to study for the baccalaure´at, which was—
and remains—the prerequisite for admission to a French university.
It is thus misleading to suggest that the education of this elite was ‘assimilationist’ in
its content.27 To be sure, French language, with dictation, comprehension and
grammar taking pride of place, occupied ten hours per week (approximately a third
of the curriculum), with the rest of the curriculum made up of mathematics, physical
and natural sciences, geography and history.28 But, overall, the curriculum at Ponty
until the early 1930s ‘was essentially a watered-down version of that in French EPS
[upper primary schools] and normal [teacher-training] schools’.29 Thereafter, follow-
ing criticism that the school’s curriculum had ‘become far too abstract and aca-
demic’,30 renewed efforts were made to ‘africanise’ the curriculum in order to adapt
the education provided to what the colonial government perceived as African needs,
which meant focusing education more on vocational training and improving agricul-
ture.31 This emphasis on ‘africanisation’ of the curriculum remained the dominant
trend until 1945, when African demands for the ‘decolonisation’ of education, by
which was meant an end to ‘adapted’ education and making metropolitan curricula
and diplomas available to Africans throughout French West Africa, initiated an inex-
orable move towards the introduction of full French metropolitan-style education—
including the baccalaure´at—in French West Africa..32 Thus all the future leaders of
French West Africa with whom this article is concerned had passed through Ponty
before a real ‘assimilationist’ education was introduced.
However, if the education provided at Ponty was not assimilationist, in the sense
that it did not provide metropolitan-style education with the aim of creating ‘Black
Frenchmen’, as one British commentator at the time suggested,33 what was the
nature of the political socialisation that took place at Ponty? Clearly, the process did
not start at Ponty, but it continued and intensified a process begun in the regional
and upper primary schools. It also became more sophisticated and more focused, as
Ponty was not simply a school. It was the training ground for the new elite of
Franco-African fonctionnaires (civil servants) that the colonial government wanted
to create in French West Africa.34 What then were the values, assumptions and
norms that were inculcated at Ponty and how did Pontins respond to them? The
first point is that, despite the limitations of their education, Ponty students neverthe-
less saw themselves as an elite. They remained fiercely proud of the fact that they had
graduated from the grande e´cole of French West Africa and of their status as
ex-Pontins.35 The hurdles they had crossed in order reach the apex of the colony’s
education pyramid, notably the highly selective school system in which any pupils
considered unsuitable for further schooling on either academic grounds or for
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reasons of character had been carefully weeded out, and the highly competitive, fed-
eration-wide entry examination to the school were a factor in this. The fact that Ponty
was a boarding school, a self-contained community situated on a small island off
Dakar, also contributed to this self-perception.
Second, Ponty graduates were imbued with a sense of their modernity. Clearly this is
a fluid concept, yet the sense of being ‘modern’ does encapsulate a key dimension of
how members of this French-educated elite defined themselves in relation to ‘tra-
ditional’ African society. One aspect of this is the adoption of a western lifestyle.
The importance of the role played by Ponty in this process has been underlined by
one of its best-known graduates, Mamadou Dia:
The time at Ponty was very important...it was at Ponty that I really came into contact
with western life, with modern life. Before that I did not even know how to wear a
jacket, trousers or tie. It was at Ponty that, as part of the school’s uniform, I wore a
European suit, jacket, tunic and shirt for the first time...I ate at table for the first time
at Ponty. . .All these things were new to me.36
For most Ponty students, their time at the school was also their first real contact with
French culture, in particular French literature and history. Dia describes how many of
them became avid readers of French literature.37 Moreover, French history did not at
this time form part of the curriculum in primary or upper primary schools in French
West Africa. In these schools they would have studied ‘French power, French West
Africa and the history of civilisation’.38 But it was at Ponty that most African students
received their first lessons about the history of France39 and were encouraged to
identify ‘with the conquerors of French West Africa rather than with the defeated or
colonized Africans’ and in their sense of ‘loyalty, gratitude and often a strongly felt
identification of themselves as French as well as African (despite their realization
that they were neither fully equal nor could they fully adopt French culture)’.40 The
strength of this identification with France is strikingly expressed by Houphoue¨t-
Boigny in his manifesto for the 1945 Constituent Assembly elections:
My uncle died bravely in the service of France. It is the same uterine blood that runs
in my veins. His blood cannot lie. The grand nephew of bloodthirsty black kinglets, I
belong to the race of those who, for centuries before the arrival of the French, only
knew and subscribed to the law of the survival of the fittest. At school my French
teachers taught me man’s duty towards his superiors and certain governors and
administrators under whom I have had the privilege of serving impressed upon
me the deep meaning of this last word. Thus it was France that took me from the
bush, from the savage Akoue´ bush, and launched me on a path that is difficult to
follow but whose ultimate objective is EVOLUTION.41
However, superior French civilisation did not emerge naturally through some kind
of organic process of evolution, but through struggle. Teaching French history to
Africans necessarily meant teaching them about the French Revolution and, despite
the reservations of some colonial officials that ‘ideas of liberty and rebellion might
be taken wrongly (i.e. too literally) by young Africans’, it seems that the French Revo-
lution enjoyed a place of honour in the curriculum.42 At the same time instructions to
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teachers made it clear that it was not the taking of the Bastille and the overthrow of the
ancien re´gime that should be studied. Rather, the struggles of the Revolution should be
presented as ‘well-intentioned struggles against war itself [and] to promote civilis-
ation’.43 This chimed with Pontins’ sense of representing the forces of modernity, of
being at the forefront of France’s self-appointed civilising mission in Africa. They
identified with the values of republican France and saw themselves as vectors for
French republican values in much the same way as French instituteurs were seen as
promoters of modernity, in the vanguard of the struggle against obscurantism, in
rural France under the Third Republic.44
A further key aspect of modernity is that society ceases to be governed by tradition
and is organised instead according to abstract principles formulated for that purpose.
This meant that, as in metropolitan France, education in French West Africa was
secular.45 This was seen as essential if education was to succeed in inculcating the
rational outlook and ‘modern’ values associated with French republicanism. In
addition, at Ponty particular emphasis was placed on cultivating in students a sense
of duty, so as to ‘turn youngsters from widely varied ethnic, cultural and religious
backgrounds into dedicated functionaries who shared...ideals of service to the
French patrie’.46 The significance attached to the notion of duty is evident in the quo-
tation from Houphoue¨t-Boigny’s manifesto above and was considered especially
important at Ponty as all Pontins were training to become civil servants.
Thus, although every effort was made to ensure that the education provided at
Ponty was not assimilationist, it clearly had an assimilationist dimension. This was
a result not only of the exposure to European customs and the emphasis placed on
the French language but also of the fact that students were taught to identify with
values and with a patrie that were not their own, even if they were not ultimately
admitted as full members of that patrie.
Third, and this was no doubt an unintended product of the process of political
socialisation that they underwent, Ponty students gained a strong sense of their par-
ticular status and strategic importance within the colonial system. Their competence
in French and the very fact of having made it to Ponty no doubt encouraged them to
see themselves in this way. Moreover, since colonial rule was legitimated in French
republican discourse largely by the fact that it was portrayed as civilising, modernising
and progressive and since there were so few Europeans in French West Africa, this
meant that the small elite of French-educated Africans was in practice destined to
play a key role in bringing the French language, culture and values to Africans and
acting as a force for ‘modernity’ in ‘traditional’ society.47 In taking on this role, they
were aware that they occupied a key strategic position within the colonial system as
intermediaries between ‘modern’ French and ‘traditional’ African society.
However, once they took up their appointments in the colonial service, Ponty
graduates quickly discovered the practical limits to their elite status. Two surveys of
African instituteurs (primary school teachers) (nearly 50 per cent of all Ponty gradu-
ates in the period up to 1945 trained as teachers)48 provide a remarkable insight into
Ponty graduates’ perceptions of the dichotomy between their view of themselves as a
colonial elite occupying a key strategic position between French and African society
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and their treatment by the colonial administration. Almost all the respondents
commented on their poor salaries and working conditions compared to their
European counterparts doing the same work. In addition, all respondents in both
surveys commented on the lack of respect accorded to them by colonial officials.49
Instead, they complained that they were often treated with suspicion as a potentially
destabilising influence precisely because of their French education, were subjected to
regular inspections and frequently transferred from one post to another for reasons
that had nothing to do with their professional competence. The strong sense of self-
worth that they had developed while studying at Ponty was not therefore borne out
by their experience working for the colonial service.
Despite these grievances, most Ponty graduates—including most instituteurs—felt a
great sense of loyalty to France.50 Given what we said above about the treatment of
African civil servants working for the colonial service, this strong sense of loyalty
to, and identification with, France requires some explanation. One reason was no
doubt the relative material benefits that attached to working for the colonial govern-
ment. Regardless of the discrimination to which they were subject in terms of their
salaries and working conditions and whatever the hardships they suffered, their
employment in the colonial service enabled them to enjoy a standard of living that
was vastly superior to that of the great majority of Africans. Yet this in itself was no
guarantee of continuing political loyalty to the colonial power, as the British were to
discover in their African colonies after the Second World War. This is where an
appreciation of the process of political socialisation of this inter-war cohort of
Ponty-educated Africans can help us to understand the nature of this loyalty. To do
this we need now to turn to the ideology of French republicanism, to understand
how it was represented at Ponty and how Ponty students responded to, reinterpreted
and exploited this ideology after leaving the school.
The origins of the French republic lie in the Revolution, which is presented by
republicans of all political hues as the victory of modernity over tradition, of reason
over obscurantism and of liberty over tyranny. France’s civilising mission in Africa
was justified by reference to the promotion of these ‘universal’ values and it was
this compelling lesson that African students at Ponty were taught. Yet, given that
these values were constantly belied in French West Africa by the inherently authoritar-
ian nature of colonial rule and by their daily experience of colonialism, it would seem
paradoxical that French-educated Africans should nonetheless feel such a strong sense
of loyalty to France.51 One might expect, as Coulibaly has suggested, that they would
be obliged ‘to make a choice between, on the one hand, “liberty” and the “anticolonial
struggle”, that give priority to their links with the African people, and on the other, the
struggle for colonial domination, that gives priority to solidarity with the colonial
power. Because one cannot be at once a resister and a collaborator, anticolonialist
and colonialist.’52 The paradox is, however, more apparent than real, since adherence
to French republican values made it possible to believe that they were part of a univer-
sal struggle, the ultimate aim of which was the triumph of the values of modernity,
reason and liberty over tradition, obscurantism and tyranny. Moreover, their strategi-
cally important position at the meeting point between Africa and France, mediating
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between and interpreting each culture for the other, placed them at the nodal point of
the new Franco-African society that senior colonial officials and many of the French-
educated African elite shared as their vision for the future.53 As a result, Ponty students
in the inter-war period did not see any necessary contradiction between their criticism
of colonial rule and their identification with, and political loyalty to, French republi-
canism. Lacking at this point any actual direct experience of France itself, their loyalty
was to an ideal vision of a republican France that was presented as modernising, pro-
gressive and generous.
Thus Ponty graduates and senior colonial officials shared certain assumptions and
values, notably the commitment to French republicanism and the vision of a future
Franco-African society derived from the best elements of French and African
culture. However shared assumptions and values do not mean political agreement.
The points of contention that were emerging in the 1930s were: who would define
and interpret the values and norms of French republicanism for African needs and
who would control politically this new Franco-African society? The coming to
power of the Popular Front in 1936, at the very moment when key political actors
were beginning to stake out their positions, was an important moment in both defin-
ing the terms of this emerging struggle for political influence and laying the foun-
dations for future political alliances.
III
The Popular Front came to power promising wide-ranging, albeit ill-defined, colonial
reform. Its election victory in 1936 raised the political hopes of the French-educated
African elite in French West Africa and was received particularly enthusiastically in the
coastal areas and the main towns. In Dakar, for example, on 14 July 1936 there was a
colourful 5,000-strong procession through the streets, led by some forty Europeans,
with red flags, clenched fists and ‘Popular Front’ logos stuck onto colonial
helmets!54 The impact of the Popular Front was not, however, confined to these
areas. African teachers, often encouraged by their French colleagues, carried the
Popular Front message into the interior of French West Africa. Popular Front
committees sprang up in towns throughout the colony and raised African hopes for
substantive change.55 Later in the year Marius Moutet, the first ever Socialist colonial
minister, became the first colonial minister to visit French West Africa. As a clear sign
of his government’s reformist intentions, he used his visit personally to install the new
governor-general, Marcel de Coppet, whom he appointed to replace Jules Bre´vie´. He
gave a speech on arrival in the colony in which he promised to continue France’s
‘mission fraternelle’ in Africa by improving the human rights of colonial peoples
living under French republican rule and which ended by proclaiming that: ‘The
Republic is the country of the liberation of men, whoever they are.’56 This ‘universalist’
language reflected the Socialist (SFIO) view of the French republican imperial project
as leading ultimately to the liberation of all those living under French rule.
The Popular Front thus represented a crucial moment in the political socialisation
of the inter-war generation of French-educated Africans as it encouraged them to
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make a distinction between the ‘colonial Frenchman’ who was their traditional
interlocutor in French West Africa and whose racism and authoritarianism were a
feature of ‘right-wing colonialism’, and the ‘true republicans’ of the left who presented
themselves as progressive and generous colonial modernisers.57 Whereas the former
laid emphasis on order and stability, the latter appealed to the populist and progressive
tradition in French republicanism. This humanitarian colonialism of the Popular
Front needs to be understood in the context of the prevailing ethos of the left and
centre-left at this time, which projected its colonisation altruiste (colonial humanism)
as promoting closer international links and greater co-operation between the peoples
of the world and according to which the colonial power took on the responsibility to
improve the material and moral conditions in which the less advanced, subject peoples
lived.58 Within French West Africa it was through their contact with French teachers,
the majority of whom were left-wing and committed to promoting the universal and
progressive values of French republicanism, that most French-educated Africans came
into direct contact with such political ideas.59 These contacts, by their own admission,
had a significant formative influence on their own political ideas since they appeared
to open the door to a reformed, non-racial Greater France.60 And in the struggle to
achieve this dream of a new society, Moutet’s message was that their natural allies
were not other Africans but French progressive republicans—colonial reformers
with whom they could collaborate in an effort to realise their common dream of an
alternative Greater France conceived as a non-racial, supra-national federation.
It is important to understand the political context within which the inter-war
French-educated elite espoused this assimilationist vision. As subjects they did not
enjoy the political rights and freedoms enjoyed by African citizens resident in the
Four Communes. It is not therefore surprising that their political campaigns should
focus on gaining these rights. In allying themselves with left republicans they
adopted the universalist discourse of the Popular Front to stake their claim to equal
rights with French citizens. In this sense their adoption of assimilationist themes
should be seen as ‘situational’: it does not mean that they accepted the rejection,
indeed destruction, of African cultures implicit therein nor does it mean that they
accepted without reservation the political terms on which this assimilationist vision
was put forward. Rather, they wanted, and expected, to negotiate as equal partners
the political structures that would govern the Franco-African society that both the
new left republican government and the inter-war elite of French-educated Africans
envisioned.
The outbreak of war and the subsequent imposition of the Vichy regime in 1940
brought a return to a ‘harder’, more authoritarian style of colonial rule in French
West Africa, under which all Africans were subjects and it was no longer possible,
as it had been in the past, for ‘deserving’ French-educated Africans to become
French citizens. As a result racial discrimination between whites and blacks in
French West Africa became more stark. Yet, in a somewhat perverse way, the open
racism of the Vichy regime actually helped republicans, insofar as it made it possible
for them to portray the Vichy period as an aberration by contrasting Vichy colonial
policy with their own approach, which accorded political rights to Africans.61 They
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could thus re-create the notion after the war that French colonialism, republican-style,
was progressive and modernising, and suggest that it was through integration into the
Republic, rather than separation from it, that African emancipation would be
achieved.
This notion was clearly articulated for the first time by the Popular Front govern-
ment and it was adopted by the inter-war French-educated elite as a basis for their
claim to equal rights. De Coppet was recalled to Paris in 1938 and the Popular
Front government fell without having the time to deliver on its reformist plans.
Some historians have justifiably argued that the Popular Front would never have
been able to deliver its reform plans within a colonial context, caught as it was in
the innate contradictions between its liberal reformism and the inherently authoritar-
ian nature of colonial rule.62 However, the key point here is that, after the war, those
Africans who had looked to the Popular Front government as opening the possibility
for a renegotiation of the political compact between the colonial government and the
French-educated elite now looked to the return of a republican regime, dominated by
the left and with Moutet reinstalled as colonial minister, to deliver on its commitment
to a non-racial Greater France. Their expectation of real change was also heightened by
the changed balance of political forces; France emerged from the war weakened and
also indebted to Africans for their support during the war. General De Gaulle’s
speech opening the Brazzaville conference in 1944 marked a recognition that the
old colonial regime had come to an end and that colonial reform was now inevitable.63
Political liberties, including freedom of association and the right to form political
parties and trade unions, partially granted under the Popular Front, were now to be
extended to the whole of French West Africa, and the principle of African elected rep-
resentation in the future National Assembly in Paris was accepted.
As soon as the war ended there was an upsurge in political and trade union activity,
the main focus of which was an end to racial discrimination and a claim for ‘equal pay
for equal work’ with Europeans. The decision to rename the colonial empire the
French Union in 1946 and the affirmation in the new constitution of the Fourth
Republic that metropolitan France and its overseas possessions formed a ‘one and
indivisible republic’ seemed to suggest that Paris was prepared to respond positively
to such demands.64 These campaigns set the parameters of the political campaigns
of the French-educated elite in French West Africa after the war: the demand for deco-
lonisation within the context of continued links with France.65
To be sure, this assimilationist vision of a Greater France with equal rights for all
involved a political sleight of hand, since all Africans would in practice never be
able to achieve equal rights through integration into a ‘one and indivisible France’,
if for no other reason than that there was no realistic prospect of the metropole
funding it. French-educated African leaders were not necessarily dupes in this, but
in the post-war context they knew that ‘it was much harder to reject a call for equality
based on French republican ideals than to fight against a nationalist call for indepen-
dence’.66 Nor were they prepared to accept the elimination of their own culture
implicit in the notion of cultural assimilation.67 The vision nevertheless provided a
powerful incentive for an elite cohort of French-educated Africans who came to
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political maturity between the wars to espouse the notion that progress, modernis-
ation and liberty would come through the maintenance of a relationship with
France, the terms of which they would play the key role in negotiating. An understand-
ing of this is essential to an appreciation of their political stance after the war.
IV
The cohort of French-educated Africans on whom we are focusing here was educated
at Ponty between the wars and became active in politics when the Vichy regime ended
in French West Africa in 1943. This was also the moment when the French Communist
Party, which was in government from the liberation of France until 1947, decided to
take a hitherto unprecedented interest in Africa. Communist activists set up associ-
ations (Groupes d’actions re´publicaines, France combattante) in Africa. These
groups had an almost exclusively European membership until 1946, when the Com-
munist Party re-established a colonial section under Raymond Barbe´ and encouraged
its activists to create Groupes d’Etudes Communistes (Communist study groups) in
the colonies. Their objective was to co-ordinate the activities of these various group-
ings, to attract African members and, finally, ‘the creation in each territory of a demo-
cratic (or progressive) party with the aim of uniting Africans (together with a few
French people) around the programme of the CNR [Conseil National de la
Re´sistance]’.68
The Communist Party’s official line was that, given its economic under-develop-
ment and the lack of a proletariat, French West Africa was not yet ready for the estab-
lishment of Communist Party sections.69 Rather, African activists should be
encouraged to join with French Communists and the metropolitan working class in
the common struggle against the forces of capitalism in the form of metropolitan
and colonial trusts. Thus, Groupes d’Etudes Communistes were formed in the main
urban centres of French West Africa to provide political education and a meeting-
place for all those, French and Africans, who shared this aim. In ideological terms,
the training provided by the Groupes d’Etudes Communistes was Marxist-Leninist
in inspiration; they promoted a radical anti-imperialist line, but, the Communist
Party having firmly established itself during the Occupation as a French national
party, it did not support—or at best was ambivalent about—colonial nationalist
movements. Rather, having played a central role in the re-branding of the empire as
the French Union, its political stance was to campaign for a united struggle of all
the peoples of the French Union against Anglo-American imperialism. In Senegal,
for example, it organised a meeting of the France-USSR association in 1945. It also
encouraged its activists to take posts as teachers, engineers and technicians, where
they often formed close and enduring friendships with French-educated Africans.70
In the context of French politics, the stance of the Communist Party should be seen
as rooted in the traditions and ideas of French left republicanism dating back to the
Revolution of 1789 and that first found political expression in French West Africa
during the Popular Front.71
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It is remarkable how many of the future political leaders of French West Africa, and
their close collaborators, were active in the Groupes d’Etudes Communistes. For
example, we know that Houphoue¨t-Boigny attended meetings of both the Abidjan
and Dakar Groupes, that Ouezzin Coulibaly was a member of the executive committee
of the Bobo-Dioulasso Groupe and that Modibo Keita’s brother, but not Modibo Keita
himself, was a member of the Bamako Groupe. We also know that Hamani Diori’s
close collaborator and second-in-command in the Parti Progressiste Nige´rien,
Boubou Hama, who was to become president of Niger’s National Assembly after inde-
pendence, was a member of the Niamey Groupe, and that the country’s future interior
minister, Djamballa Yansambou, was its president.72 Even those French-educated Afri-
cans who did not play an active part in these various groupings came into contact with
Communist ideas through the propaganda activities of these and other groups and
through an increasingly active local press.73
Through the Communist Party, such ideas also had a significant influence on the
political programme of French West Africa’s first trans-territorial party, the Rassem-
blement De´mocratique Africain (RDA), which was launched with Communist
support at a founding congress in Bamako in October 1946. Although the party
became associated with radical politics because of its links with the Communist
Party, it was not a nationalist party in the sense that it emphatically did not
support secession from France. Its launch manifesto stated:
Our adhesion to the French Union, that we solemnly proclaim, is justified by a
realistic view of the world’s political problems, by our confidence in Africa’s
destiny and by the certainty that, despite the forces of reaction, we shall win the
liberal democratic and human conditions which will make it possible for Africa
freely to develop its particular talents and skills.
For this reason, tens of thousands of Africans, fraternally united with French
people who share this democratic ideal, have joined together in parties, movements
or democratic, progressive or popular unions.74
The propagation of such ideas throughout French West Africa played a key role in
reinforcing the identification of French-educated Africans with the modernising
norms and values of French left republicanism. However, whereas it was with the
Socialists, and in particular the Socialist colonial minister Marius Moutet and his
appointee as governor-general, Marcel de Coppet, that the French-educated elite
sought to work to implement reforms in 1936–38, in 1946 Moutet was seen as an
obstacle to further progress. He did everything in his power to prevent the founding
congress taking place and put pressure on African Socialist de´pute´s (Le´opold Senghor,
Lamine Gue`ye, Yacine Diallo) not to attend, thereby increasing the Communist Party’s
influence over the congress’s proceedings and enhancing its credentials as the only
truly anti-imperialist party in France. To French-educated Africans it was thus the
Communist rather than the Socialist Party that now represented the political alterna-
tive to old-style right-wing exploitative colonialism on the one hand and secession
from France on the other. Moreover, the Groupes d’Etudes Communistes did not
cease to exist with the creation of the Rassemblement De´mocratique Africain;
rather than intervening directly in the political life of the territories, they now took
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on the role of study circles and the provision of training for political activists. As Suret-
Canale reflects, the Communist Party’s methods of organisation and action thus con-
tinued to exert a profound influence on the future political leaders of French West
Africa.75
After the war the Comite´s d’Etudes Franco-Africaines (CEFA), the first of which was
created in Dakar in February 1945, were also an important vector for the spread of left
republican ideas in the territory. The Comite´s supported a policy of colonial modern-
isation through closer integration with the republic: ‘The CEFAs wish to see this
French community come into being under the emblem of the Republic: Liberty—
Equality—Fraternity.’76 The point was underlined in a letter from the Dakar section
of the Comite´s d’Etudes Franco-Africaines to Senghor: ‘We are neither separatists
nor conspirators. We simply want to gain the right to be members of the French
family as equals and not as poor relations.’ The same letter also proclaimed their inten-
tion of working within ‘republican legality’ for ‘the progressive emancipation of Afri-
cans’ and for ‘French nationality...which we demand as a matter of urgency’.77 Lamine
Gue`ye was appointed its political director. Left republican ideas also spread through
the local press, notably the newspaper Re´veil, through the Universite´ Populaire Afri-
caine, which was run by French teachers who organised evening classes as well as
public lectures on contemporary political and social issues, and through contacts
between the local Groupes d’Etudes Communistes and the Dakar trade union federa-
tion that was affiliated to the Communist Confe´de´ration Ge´ne´rale du Travail.78
V
The norms and values to which the inter-war generation of French-educated Africans
felt a sense of loyalty were the product of a specific process of political socialisation
that can be understood only through an appreciation of, on the one hand, the particu-
lar nature of the French education that they received and the context in which they
received it and, on the other, the formative political experiences from which they
acquired their political values and attitudes. These processes of political socialisation
have left a triple legacy in francophone West Africa. First, they led to the emergence of
a dependent ‘national-colonial’ elite that occupied a crucial strategic position at the
intersection of French and African society. This elite was dependent, not in the
classic neocolonial sense that it had no autonomous power, but rather in the sense
that its position of power depended on its strategic position at the political interface
between French and African society. This actually meant that it occupied a position of
considerable power and it is this, rather than its loyalty to the French nation-state, that
explains its attachment to the maintenance of close links with France.
Second, with regard to the identification with French left republicanism, this
became associated in the minds of this generation of French-educated Africans with
modernisation and progressive politics. The corollary of this was a distrust of
‘Anglo-Saxon’ liberal politics, portrayed as the harbinger of capitalism which was
the root cause of the economic exploitation of the colonies.79 Moreover, British colo-
nial policy in Africa was seen as having promoted indirect rule, the effect of which was
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to bolster the power of the traditional chiefs and limit that of the educated elite. For
this reason, British policy was portrayed in French West Africa as reactionary because
it maintained the particularism of African societies and retarded the economic, social
and political development of Africa by favouring traditional elites over modernising
western-educated elites. French policy, in contrast, was seen as superior because it
was carried out in the name of the universal republican values of liberty, equality
and fraternity. One important consequence of this was that there was for many
years an enduring distrust of American and British intentions in Africa among
French-educated African leaders of this generation, which manifested itself as a reluc-
tance to undertake any rapprochement with anglophone African leaders who were
perceived as too close to the United States or Britain.
The final dimension of the political legacy of the processes of political socialisation
examined here can be discerned at the level of the thinking about politics of this inter-
war generation of French-educated African leaders, which was heavily influenced by a
set of norms and values derived from French republicanism. This is reflected, first, in a
belief in the centralisation of power, the unitary structure of the state and in govern-
ment claims to represent and express the will of ‘the people’ over and above the
sectional claims of particular interest groups, clans or ethnic groups. Taken together,
these have led to a tendency towards intolerance of political opposition and more
broadly to a deep distrust of ‘Anglo-Saxon’ liberalism and pluralist politics. The pro-
gressive and modernising values of French republicanism, and this includes left repub-
licanism, have not therefore necessarily been associated with a belief in the values and
norms of liberal democracy. Moreover, we have seen that, at the end of the Second
World War, the Communist Party incarnated the ideas and values of French left repub-
licanism. In terms of political organisation, its guiding principles were the twin
notions of the vanguard party and democratic centralism. Second, the notion of the
state as a civilising force, educating and promoting modernisation in the face of a
backward-looking, traditionalist civil society is also an integral element of this repub-
lican narrative. In this view, and in the absence of progressive and modernising
elements within civil society, the responsibility for promoting the liberty of citizens
must be assumed by the State. The influence of these ideas was further reinforced
by the fact that all these African leaders belonged to a language community that
locked them into a francophone world.
The legacy of this way of thinking about politics can be seen in postcolonial French
West Africa in the preference for single-party rule, the hostility to autonomous groups
and the notion of the State, controlled by the party, at the forefront of the struggle for
progress and modernisation. These were common themes in the political thinking and
discourse of both the political left and right and their legacy can be seen as strongly in
the political line and treatment of political opposition by Keita’s left-wing Union
Soudanaise (US-RDA) as in Houphoue¨t-Boigny’s conservative Parti De´mocratique
de la Coˆte d’Ivoire (PDCI-RDA), which ruled Coˆte d’Ivoire as the single party from
1960 to 1990. As Jean-Pierre Dozon has commented, ‘the PDCI was for 30 years the
single party in Coˆte d’Ivoire and, despite its right-wing politics, it functioned using
methods that were exactly the same as those used by the PCF in its political
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youth’.80 This is not of course to suggest that the preference for authoritarian, single-
party rule was unique to postcolonial Francophone Africa. All African leaders inher-
ited colonial states that were ill-prepared for independence: poor in resources and qua-
lified personnel, often riven by submerged—or not so submerged—ethnic rivalries,
they had no tradition of democratic processes and institutions and were economically
under-developed. The pressures towards authoritarian rule were, in the immediate
postcolonial era, virtually irresistible. What was distinctive in Francophone Africa
was the way in which the move to authoritarianism was underpinned by an explicit
discourse of modernisation rooted in the traditions of French left republicanism.81
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Soudan adopted a broadly left republican stance. Widely read by French-educated Africans,
they were harshly critical of the colonial regime. Such ideas also circulated through the activi-
ties of the Comite´s d’Etudes Franco-Africaines (CEFA), which sprung up in many urban
centres of French West Africa after the war; see Chafer, The End of Empire in French West
Africa, 70–72. See also below.
[74] Dalloz, Textes sur la de´colonisation, 35–36.
[75] Suret-Canale, Les Groupes d’Etudes Communistes, 69.
[76] Undated circular sent out to all CEFA sections, AAOF 17G526/144.
[77] Letter from CEFA, Dakar, to Senghor, 25 Feb. 1944, AAOF 17G127/17.
[78] Re´veil was originally produced by the France combattante group. It was edited by Charles-Guy
Etcheverry, a Socialist local councillor who joined the Rassemblement De´mocratique Africain
in 1948 and effectively made the newspaper the mouthpiece of the Rassemblement De´mocra-
tique Africain. As for the Confe´de´ration Ge´ne´rale du Travail (CGT), it was important in terms
of promoting radical anti-imperialist ideas in French West Africa and simultaneously cement-
ing a network of enduring links between French and African trade unionists. There is insuffi-
cient space to discuss this dimension here. However it has been thoroughly covered in
Delanoue, ‘La CGT et les syndicats de l’Afrique noire de colonisation franc¸aise’ and Dewitte,
‘La CGT et les syndicats d’Afrique occidentale franc¸aise’.
[79] In this context, it should be noted that the term ‘liberal’ in the Rassemblement De´mocratique
Africain manifesto quoted above should not be interpreted in an Anglo-Saxon sense as refer-
ring either to free markets or pluralist politics; ‘liberal’ here is used in the French sense to refer
to the liberty that is the product of social and economic development and modernisation.
[80] Dozon, Fre`res et sujets, 335.
[81] For a fuller discussion of the influence of French political culture on Francophone Africa, see
LeVine, Politics in Francophone Africa, esp. 96– 103.
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